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On a recent visit to Mogadishu I was again 
confronted with the tension between local 
ownership and international self-interest. 
On the one hand was the Somali President, 
who wanted to assert his sovereign authority 
and lead the peace process according to his 
vision for Somalia. On the other hand, there 
was a powerful but diverse international 
community that has the resources necessary 
to enhance peace, though such resources 
were accompanied by a set of ideas concern-
ing what the Somali President should be 
doing. Officially everyone claimed to sup-
port the Federal Government of Somalia, but 
in reality each outside nation and organisa-
tion is engaged in Somalia for its own stra-
tegic political, security and economic needs 
and interests. 
Should we then be surprised that any gov-
ernment, let alone a fragile one emerging 
from twenty years of conflict and instability 
as in Somalia, would find it extremely chal-
lenging to coordinate all these international 
partners? The reality is sadly that the limited 
governing capacity that the President and his 
government have is being overwhelmed by 
the transaction costs of needing to engage 
with each of these international actors. 
Instead of governing Somalia, the President 
and his cabinet are forced to meet with and 
react to each of the proposals offered by his 
country’s international partners. Instead of 
leading the Somali peace process accord-
ing to his government’s vision, they have 
to transact away key elements to the satis-
faction of each of their partners, and give 
enough prominence to each of their pet pro-
jects, to keep sorely needed resources flow-
ing to Somalia.
The dilemma I am describing here is nor-
mal, i.e. it is to be expected given the various 
interests at stake and the relative power of 
the various actors involved. What is abnor-
mal is the degree to which we fail to take 
these factors into account. There is a persis-
tent lack of recognition that the amount of 
time and energy that the new government 
in Somalia, and all such governments, spend 
on servicing the needs of their international 
partners contributes to instability and fragil-
ity. No doubt the government of Somalia, 
like every other of these so-called fragile gov-
ernments, believe it can come out on top of 
this game, but the reality is that he who pays 
the piper calls the tune. 
It is thus not surprising that for many in 
the stability business, the notion of ‘local 
ownership’ has become a buzz-word. It is 
one of those words that has to be in any doc-
ument about end states and exit strategies, 
yet no one really expects it to be meaning-
fully pursued. The need for more local own-
ership has been recognised and discussed in 
the statebuilding and peacebuilding litera-
ture for at least a decade, and if you include 
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the development literature perhaps even as 
much as a quarter century. Some would argue 
that the reason why it has not become more 
of a reality in all this time has nothing to do 
with how much it is obviously desirable, and 
everything to do with how inherently impos-
sible it is to achieve. 
Many in this school typically offer two 
explanations. They argue that in societies 
emerging from conflict, local capacity is so 
weak that it is impossible for the locals to 
govern themselves, let alone coordinate the 
international effort. The notion of local own-
ership is thus unrealistic. They don’t know 
what they need and what they want, and 
they need to be helped for their own good. 
The other argument is that it is impossibly 
difficult for external peacebuilders to know 
which leaders truly represent local needs 
and interests, and it is thus best to consult 
widely but not to give the lead to any particu-
lar grouping until there has been an election 
or some other demonstration of the popu-
lation’s will. Until then, the external peace-
builders see themselves as acting in a kind 
of unacknowledged guardian role, in which 
they act according to what they think are in 
the best interest of the society. 
Very few recognise or acknowledge the 
role the international community plays in 
undermining local ownership. Some may 
acknowledge this challenge, though most 
argue that it is unintended. In Mogadishu 
this seemed to me to be a clearly foreseeable 
and logical outcome of the transaction costs 
imposed on the new government. In theory 
it should be possible to prevent overburden-
ing a new government, but we are faced with 
a classical case of the tragedy of the commons. 
Each international partner, acting indepen-
dently and rationally according to its own 
self-interest, contributes to undermining the 
resilience of the local government. Although 
some may grasp that collectively, as a result 
of the transactional burden and the imposi-
tion of foreign norms and models, they are 
contributing to the very weakness of the 
government that they are meant to support; 
they are unable to change their ways, and act 
in their common long-term best interests. 
The avoid such a situation, each of the 
international partners will need to some-
how exercise voluntary self-restraint. How 
does one break through the tragedy of com-
mons and get the individual agents to act in 
their best common interests? To address this 
dilemma, I suggest three steps. These steps 
are premised on the notion that improving 
the information and understanding each 
agent has about its role in the larger peace-
building system – and the effect it is hav-
ing on the government – may increase the 
chances that they may take steps to mitigate 
against such negative effects. By increasing 
the information in the system one also hopes 
to encourage more open communication 
about these effects among agents, especially 
among internal and external agents. The 
three steps are outlined below.
First, external peacebuilders need to re-
affirm the principle of local ownership and 
re-commit to make it the starting point of 
their approach to state- and peacebuilding. 
No one seems to challenge the essential logic 
that for any peace process to be sustainable 
it has to make sense for, and serve the inter-
ests of the people directly involved. 
Secondly, international partners need 
help to recognise and acknowledge their 
role in undermining the resilience of the 
very fragile governments they are commit-
ted to help. External peacebuilders need to 
recognise that they intervene in conflict and 
post-conflict situations to serve their own 
interests. As a result they tend to be more 
supply driven then they like to admit, even 
to themselves. Perhaps there is a naïve belief 
among some that – because the external 
and internal peacebuilders share the same 
overall objective, namely to pursue sustain-
able peace – they are motivated by the same 
interests. But we know this is not the case. 
They are more likely to have different under-
standings of what sustainable peace means 
and different theories for how to achieve sus-
tainable peace. 
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Third, external and internal peacebuilders 
need help to openly discuss their respective 
interests. The tension between the local own-
ership principle and interest-driven external 
initiatives will continue to be a predictable 
characteristic of international peacebuilding 
processes. It is the product of inherently con-
tradictory interests that cannot be resolved, 
only transacted on a case-by-case basis. It is 
not undesirable – in fact it serves a very use-
ful evolutionary purpose – but it needs to be 
acknowledged, understood and discounted, 
not ignored.
Below I consider the challenge of local 
ownership – and what can be done to 
improve it – in greater detail. I also discuss 
the benefits local ownership can have for 
the resilience of fragile post-conflict govern-
ments and societies.
Local ownership
For most people in the international security 
and development sectors, what local owner-
ship really means is that the representatives 
of a given society should be encouraged to 
voluntarily choose to adopt the neoliberal 
norms and institutions that the international 
community has designed for them. There 
may be some room for hybridisation in the 
process, but at its core many international 
aid workers, peacekeepers and diplomats 
believe that some degree of top-down impo-
sition of neoliberal norms and institutions 
is warranted, because doing so represents 
international standards and the accumulated 
‘scientific’ knowledge and best practices 
of the (Western-dominated) international 
community. In other words, these agents of 
the international community believe that 
because adopting neoliberal norms and 
institutions is ultimately in the best interest 
of the country in transition, some degree of 
coercion is justified. 
This is how most people working in the 
statebuilding and peacebuilding field view 
local ownership today. From this perspective, 
the essential act of peacebuilding lies in its 
design, i.e. an international actor diagnosing 
the local problem and designing a solution 
for it – from the outside and from the top-
down. I argue for a fundamentally different 
approach. I argue for understanding sustain-
able peace as emergent from the local – from 
the inside and from the bottom-up.
My own journey to this position has been 
rather counterintuitive. I was, and remain, 
interested in peacebuilding from the perspec-
tive of the role of international organisations, 
like the United Nations and the African Union. 
I wanted to improve their ability to design 
and manage coherent multi-stakeholder 
peace missions – to enhance their capacity to 
achieve more coherent and comprehensive 
interventions – in the belief that more coher-
ence will result in more effective missions and 
thus more sustainable outcomes. My inter-
est in researching coherence within a multi-
stakeholder environment  eventually resulted 
in an interest in Complexity theory. 
When systems become so dynamic that we 
are no longer able to keep track of the effects 
of specific initiatives we commonly refer to 
them as ‘complex’. I was interested in under-
standing what it means when we say a par-
ticular conflict, or the international response 
to it, is complex? What was it that we could 
learn from applying the knowledge gener-
ated by the study of Complexity to the peace-
building context? Complexity theory address 
multi-agent systems that have the ability to 
adapt, i.e. they are able to learn from their 
history and act to change their structure 
and behaviour to adapt to changes in their 
environment. What makes them especially 
interesting is that they do this without some 
kind of central control mechanism. They 
don’t seem to need a ‘brain’ or a leader in 
order to take decisions. Instead, they have 
a kind of distributed intelligence, and they 
demonstrate emergent behaviour, including 
self-organising behaviour. Complex social 
systems, like a post-conflict society, develop 
the ability to organise and maintain them-
selves not because of a centrally controlled 
hierarchy, such as a strategic framework or a 
strategic plan, but as a result of emergence – 
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the ability of non-linear interactions to spon-
taneously result in self-regulating behaviour 
through complex feedback systems. 
For instance, complex social systems 
develop their own institutions over time 
through iterative adaptive processes, and this 
is an emergent process of self-organisation. 
Institutions are not designed and imposed, 
they emerge from the history and culture of 
a specific society. A police service is not just 
a neutral institution that can be replicated 
in any society. Every society has norms that 
relate to the appropriate role it expects its 
institutions to play when it comes to enforc-
ing its values, and these norms are critical 
to understanding the role a police service 
could and should play in any given society. 
The linkage between history, culture and 
institutional legitimacy is, from a Complex-
ity perspective, emergent from the local, not 
derived from the universal.
The most fundamental insight I gained 
from applying Complexity theory to peace-
building was the realisation that the ability 
of external agents to gain knowledge of the 
complex social systems we are dealing with 
in the peacebuilding context is inherently 
limited. Complex systems, which include all 
social systems, are non-linear, and this means 
that we are not able to know enough about 
these systems to predict their behavior using 
a linear cause-and-effect science model. 
Nor can we transfer one model that seemed 
to work well in one context to another and 
expect that it would work equally well there. 
This is because each model has a history 
that is specific to the context within which 
it emerged. Once it is divorced from that his-
tory, it loses the context within which it had 
meaning. Concepts like statebuilding and 
peacebuilding convey the assumption that 
we are able to ‘build’ the state and ‘build’ 
peace, in the same way we can design and 
build a bridge or a tunnel. In fact, social 
systems are part of the organic world, not 
the material world. Our social systems are 
bio-ecosystems; we are not like the parts 
of a machine which have specific and pre-
designed roles in a causal chain. Complex 
systems evolve, including (or in particular) in 
non-linear ways.
What are some of the implications that 
flow from these insights? Firstly, we have 
to adjust our theories of change. We have 
to acknowledge that there are no off-the-
shelf solutions and no one theory of change 
or model of state transformation, such as 
the neoliberal peace model, that can claim 
universal applicability. We have to come to 
terms with what it really means when we say 
that something is context-specific. It means 
that it can only emerge from that context. 
It does not mean that we can import a uni-
versal model and simply make a few adjust-
ments for the local culture and context.
Secondly, we need to change the way we 
plan. We need to come to terms with what it 
means when we say we cannot, in complex 
systems, diagnose the problem and design a 
solution for it. In a non-linear social system 
the ‘one-problem-one-solution’ construct 
does no longer make sense because the lin-
ear cause-and-effect logic no longer applies. 
The system is continuously evolving, and ‘the 
solution’ needs to adapt and evolve with it. 
We need a new approach to planning that 
goes beyond the old problem-solving ‘assess-
ment-design-apply’ approach. We need a 
new planning model that can recognise the 
need for continuous iterative processes and 
that enable interventions to evolve along 
with the surrounding system. 
Thirdly, we need to change the way our 
organisations learn and transfer knowledge. 
We can’t ‘learn lessons’ or identify ‘best prac-
tices’ from one situation and expect to uni-
versalise it in a way that will make it trans-
ferable to another context. At the moment 
most organisational knowledge flows from 
the centre to the periphery, from the strate-
gic to the tactical. We will have to invest in 
a new focus on learning from the context, 
from the tactical to the operational. The 
operation needs to be informed by what it 
is they are tasked to achieve strategically, 
but the knowledge they will need to achieve 
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that vision will need to be generated from 
the tactical level. 
Fourthly, we would need to change the way 
we monitor and evaluate our programmes 
and campaigns. We can’t only monitor for, 
or benchmark against, anticipated results. 
Whenever we intervene in a complex system 
it will respond in a variety of ways, some of 
which we may have intended; but a non-
linear system will also respond in many 
unintended ways. Monitoring only for the 
intended outcomes will result in us missing 
out on a great deal of important information 
about how the system is evolving. Monitor-
ing will assume great importance because it 
is only through feedback that complex sys-
tems can gain the information they need to 
adapt and evolve.
International roles and limitations
This brings us to the second step we identi-
fied in the introduction, namely that inter-
national partners need to recognise and 
acknowledge their role in undermining 
the capacity of governments they intend to 
support. Complexity theory has shed light 
on how complex systems self-organise. 
Self-organisation in the statebuilding and 
peacebuilding context refers to the various 
processes and mechanisms a society uses to 
manage its own peace consolidation process, 
i.e. the overall ability to manage its own ten-
sions, pressures, disputes, crisis and shocks 
without relapsing into violent conflict. For 
statebuilding and peacebuilding the implica-
tion is that interventions have to be essen-
tially about stimulating and facilitating the 
capacity of societies to self-organise.
Seen in this context, peacebuilding is a 
very delicate and self-contradictory process 
fraught with built-in tensions. There is an 
inherent tension in the act of promoting a 
process of self-organisation; external inter-
ference undermines the ability of the ‘self’ 
to develop (to take responsibility, to learn 
from failure and successes) sufficiently for 
self-organisation to emerge. Understanding 
this tension – and the constraints it poses 
– helps us to understand why peacebuild-
ing is so complex. It should also free us 
from illusions of easy solutions and grand 
models and help us to focus on case-by-case 
transactions that seek to reflect the inter-
face between local context and interna-
tional interests.
Many, if not most, international peace-
building missions to date have made the 
mistake of interfering so much that they 
ended-up undermining the ability of the 
local system to self-organise. External peace-
builders impose neoliberal political and judi-
cial norms and model institutions according 
to their own ideal types. In the process we 
deny these societies the room to develop 
their own institutions which are emergent 
from their own history, culture and context. 
External peacebuilders fail to recognise the 
degree to which their own norms and insti-
tutions are the product of their own history, 
culture and context. Consequently, they 
underestimate the challenge of transferring 
these norms and institutions to other cul-
tures and contexts. 
Finding an appropriate local-
international relationship
The third step we identified in the introduc-
tion was that external and internal peace-
builders need to openly discuss and transact 
their respective interests. The key to suc-
cessful statebuilding and peacebuilding lies 
in finding the appropriate balance between 
external security guarantees and resources, 
on the one hand, and the degree to which 
the local system has the freedom to develop 
its own self-organisation, on the other.
We may be able to identify and agree on 
some broad principles in, for instance, the 
form of a statebuilding and peacebuilding 
code of conduct. Ultimately, however, what 
is appropriate has to be determined in each 
specific context, as in the articulation of a 
compact between the local authorities and 
representatives of the international com-
munity. As these processes are dynamic 
and non-linear, what is appropriate will be 
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continuously changing and such compacts 
would thus also need the ability to evolve.
Conclusion
Applying Complexity theory to peacebuild-
ing leads us to conclude that self-sustaining 
peace is directly linked to, and influenced by, 
the extent to which a society has the capac-
ity and space to self-regulate. For peace con-
solidation to be self-sustainable it has to be 
the result of a home-grown, bottom-up and 
context-specific process. 
The robustness and resilience of the self-
organising capacity of a society determines 
the extent to which it can withstand pres-
sures and shocks that risk a (re)lapse into 
violent conflict. Peacebuilding should thus 
be about safeguarding, stimulating, facilitat-
ing and creating the space for societies to 
develop robust and resilient capacities for 
self-organisation.
International peacebuilding interventions 
should provide security guarantees and main-
tain the outer parameters of acceptable state 
behavior in the international system, and 
they should stimulate, facilitate and create 
the space for the emergence of robust and 
resilient self-organised systems. International 
peacebuilding interventions should not 
interfere in the local social process with the 
goal of engineering specific outcomes, such 
as trying to produce a neoliberal state. Trying 
to control the outcome produces the oppo-
site of what peacebuilding aims to achieve; 
it generates ongoing instability and depend-
ence, and it undermines self-sustainability.
The art of peacebuilding thus lies in pursu-
ing the appropriate balance between inter-
national support and home-grown context-
specific solutions. 
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